HDP’s position has come to the forefront in the election process.

For days, we have been discussing whether HDP will enter the elections as a party or with independent candidates.

The election conjuncture had made HDP’s role more noticeable; however, we are actually also passing through a critical period related with the Resolution Process.

The progress of the Resolution Process, in a sense, will be affecting HDP’s position.

First of all, I’d like to quote from Deputy Prime Minister, Yalçın Akdoğan:

“This year’s Nawruz requires a further step and message. That should be a statement directed at passing to the disarmament stage.”

In last year’s Nawruz, Öcalan said, “Shush the weapons; let the ideas speak from now on.” It was a critical stage of the Resolution Process.

However, from that date on, the PKK transited to a phase of inaction. It was a stage way behind what was aimed for in the Resolution Process.

Due to the Gezi incident process, the ceasing of the retreat, the October 6-8 incidents and Cizre, the process had entered some turbulence. The process continued, due to the resolution willpower being continued on the government and İmralı sides.

After the October 6-8 incidents, when the Resolution Process had been attributed with the “Public authority” aspect, the process has been advancing quietly and deeply.

As for the stage pointed out by the Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan’s statement “A step further than Nawruz 2013 should be taken”; it becomes evident at this point.

On March 21, 2015 Nawruz, Öcalan is expected to say, “We have ended our armed activities in Turkey.” . It’s desired from Öcalan to state that they had ended their armed activities in Turkey and the armed struggle against Turkey had come to an end.

PKK had started the armed struggle on July 14, 1984 with the Şemdinli and Eruh raids. Other than the single-sided ceasefires or inaction processes, the PKK maintained its armed struggle for the past 30 years.

On March 21, 2015, if Öcalan declares “the armed struggle in Turkey has been finished” at the Nawruz squares in Diyarbakır, it will be the beginning of a new period.

By the way, I’d like to open a paragraph here, and explain why I’ve said “the armed struggle in Turkey has been finished.”

When the Resolution Process began, the objective was the liquidation of Qandil. Those processes had been sabotaged. As for the phase at which we have arrived, there is an organization, which is conducting armed struggles intensively in Syria, Iraq and Iran. Even the existence of ISIL doesn’t make this organization’s self-liquidation and burial of their weapons meaningful. Having such an expectation would have any other meaning beyond the prolapse of the Resolution Process.

Then, it’s beneficial to be realistic and actualize the model that is possible. At this stage; PKK pulling their armed elements out of Turkish lands, declaring the end of the armed struggle in Turkey and stating that it won’t be putting up an armed struggle against Turkey can be found meaningful.

Will PKK make such a decision?

Will Öcalan make this statement?

If you had noticed, such a decision will also have an effect on HDP’s success in the elections.

HDP will be going before the voters in a mood formed by PKK, which ended a 30-year-long armed struggle.

Or, it will be the complete opposite. The “Turkization” Project would be desired to be implemented together with the PKK, who is determined on continuing the armed struggle despite the Resolution Process, while having a gun in one hand and the ballot box on the other. How convincing it might be!

By the way, it’s better to be realistic and we should see the difficulties ahead of the process.

What you call PKK is, other than its armed and political struggle, 52 separate structures, which had spread to various countries in the world, but is being administered from a single center.

This wasn’t the ultimate objective.

There are points in the process that should be resolved. I’d like to remark that some studies are being conducted on it.

Some of the above are mechanisms that will be activated after the declaration of the end of the armed struggle. Like the Monitoring Committee.

Should the things I’ve arrayed above represent a problem within the scope of a historic project?

It shouldn’t. If we are to begin our historic walk, as Turks and Kurds, then, will sick inmates, change of the prisoners and the monitoring committee constitute an obstacle?

Then, can it be expected that Öcalan would make a statement on March 21st, related with the disarmament?

PKK is the one that needs the decision of stopping the armed struggle the most.

Because, on the other side, there are opportunities that are being presented by the struggle with ISIL and the Syria conjuncture. Being on the terrorist list is like shackles on the ankles of the PKK movement. They can liquidate PKK, get themselves off of the terrorist list and continue on their path with PYD or YDH.

As for the second note, there is an HDP, which wants to exceed the 10 percent threshold with the Turkization expansion, go outside the region and be on the West of Turkey also. They are aiming to be the party of the Turks also, not just the Kurds. It’s known that, during the negotiations in İmralı, Öcalan had directed stern criticisms to their personnel, since they couldn’t provide this.

PKK’s declaration of the end of the armed struggle in Turkey would serve this conjuncture the most.

The disarmament decision had not only sprung from Turkey’s perspective, but also, proves to be a necessary form for the PKK movement.

The conjuncture had made it possible.

It’s all comes down to reading the conjuncture correctly or not?